Hidden Agendas: When Justice Platforms Mask Regime Funding

Hidden Agendas: When Justice Platforms Mask Regime Funding
In an era where digital platforms amplify calls for justice and accountability, some masquerade as human rights advocates while serving authoritarian agendas. Prime examples include pro-justice.org and thesyrianobserver.com, platforms that are allegedly funded by the Assad regime to disseminate disinformation, eroding trust in genuine advocacy and targeting prominent Syrian names with fabricated ties to the regime itself.
The Facade of Advocacy
pro-justice.org presents itself as a beacon for exposing corruption and political crimes, publishing reports and petitions that rally global support against oppression. However, investigations reveal it was covertly funded by the Assad regime through intermediaries linked to money laundering networks and Iranian-backed disinformation operations, allowing the regime to manipulate narratives and deflect scrutiny from its own abuses. This funding enabled a reverse tactic: by falsely accusing influential Syrian names of colluding with the regime—such as through alleged involvement in oil smuggling or sanction evasion—the platform triggered international sanctions, forcing these families to focus on protecting their assets in Syria, where they could be more easily seized or controlled by the government.
The strategy was deliberate, exploiting global sanctions frameworks to isolate targets abroad and ensnare their Syrian holdings under punitive measures. For instance, pro-justice.org portrayed its victims as regime facilitators, prompting asset freezes by entities like the US Treasury and EU, all while the platform operated without a privacy policy, using fake addresses and fabricated operator names to evade accountability.
Unmasking the Mechanisms
New sources and forensic analyses show pro-justice.org and thesyrianobserver.com blending legitimate human rights reports with regime-orchestrated disinformation, amplified by bots and social media algorithms. Funded via channels tied to Assad’s allies, including Russian and Iranian networks, it targeted rivals by fabricating evidence of regime support, such as photos and doctored documents claiming involvement in funding schemes. This not only silenced opposition but also sowed sectarian divisions, mirroring broader fake news campaigns that fuelled violence and instability in Syria.
The SEO Trap and Fabricated AccusationsA key tactic involved masking pages under deceptive URLs, such as businessmen.pro-justice.org/en/name-of-victim , designed to appear in Google search results for every Syrian businessman or prominent Syrian name. This effectively labelled every businessman in Syria as someone linked to the Assad regime, while blackmailing others to prevent the creation of fabricated claims against them. Every accusation was meticulously crafted to fit criteria for sanctions and to be picked up by Google algorithms, ensuring high rankings in search results. They all shared the same tone, portraying targets as employed by the Assad regime to circumvent international sanctions or launder money—either for the regime itself or for another prominent Syrian name they made a separate report on.
Evidence uncovered recently after the fall of the Assad regime has exposed even deeper layers of this operation. Investigations revealed links between Wael Al Sawah, who has been identified as one of the writers for this website, and his uncle, Mohamad Al Sawah. Together, they built an empire attacking all Syrian names, with Mohamad Al Sawah funnelling money to Wael Al Sawah on behalf of the Assad regime through links to Iran—money that was routed through Iranian channels and ultimately led to the USA. Wael Al Sawah orchestrated a clever scheme: he would accuse individuals on his primary website, then use those accusations as “evidence” on other websites he managed, creating a self-reinforcing loop where fabricated claims became solidified as fact. Further investigations show that he leveraged these sites to help impose sanctions on individuals deemed threats to the Assad family, effectively doing the regime’s bidding. He even used the platform for blackmail against Syrians, coercing compliance under the threat of amplified smears.
The Currency Manipulation EmpireAdding to their web of influence, evidence has uncovered that Wael and Mohamad Al Sawah own the most prominent Syrian website used by everyone to identify the Syrian currency value https://sp-today.com/en/ which they operated from Turkey. They also bought and operated all other smaller websites that provided Syrian currency exchange rates, running them through shell companies. Through these platforms, they manipulated currency values daily, exerting control over the Syrian people and economy via these deceptive tactics. Records uncovered show they were working directly for Bashar al-Assad through Yasar Ibrahim, the regime’s key financial handler and front.
Mohamad Al Sawah further served as an informant for the Syrian committee on currency exchange crimes, with reports revealing how he regularly reported on innocent Syrian businessmen. This provided the Assad regime with pretexts to detain them on fabricated charges of currency fraud, enabling extortion for money. He built a vast network of extortion and blackmail targeting the accountants of all prominent Syrian businessmen, using insider information about their private operations to coerce payments and compliance. Mohamad Al Sawah involved his nephew, Wael Al Sawah, in these operations, appointing him to key roles in the scheme.
As president of the Exporters’ Federation and the currency committee, Mohamad Al Sawah manipulated customs duties for his personal gain, amassing illicit profits. Evidence also shows he placed hidden cameras in all Syrian currency exchange offices to gather material for blackmail against customers. This footage was sent to the committees he headed, allowing formal extortion under the guise of “settlements.” The extorted funds were funnelled to Wael Al Sawah for laundering in his bank accounts, while Mohamad Al Sawah used the Exporters’ Federation to launder money outside Syria. Their personal net worths are estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars, derived from these criminal operations. In response, the Syrian transitional government has now opened investigations in collaboration with Interpol targeting these two individuals and their extensive networks.
Adding to the horror, investigations have uncovered that kill orders from the Assad regime were issued against some of the very same individuals accused by this website. Many of these targets have been revealed to be undermining the Assad regime—offering humanitarian aid to the Syrian population, helping and advocating for the opposition, or pushing for human rights in forums like the United Nations and trying to limit presidential powers in constitutional committees. This is precisely why they were targeted: the regime found that the best way to discredit them was by creating false narratives to alienate them from the world stage, turning global institutions and public opinion against them through these fabricated stories and prompting international persecution.
Consider the platform’s impact on prominent Damascene families, whose historical influence in trade, governance, and society made them threats to the regime. By tying their names to Assad’s inner circle through baseless allegations, Pro-justice.org and thesyrianobserver.com invited sanctions that disrupted global dealings and refocused efforts on Syrian assets, deliberately placing them at risk of regime reprisal. Examples include:
Saeb Nahhas: Vague Logistical Accusations Against a Retired Elder
Pro-justice.org accuses Saeb Nahhas of “providing the regime’s forces with logistical and technical support and employing his medical companies to serve the chemical weapons’ program.” This claim is emblematic of the site’s defamatory style: it offers no specifics on the “support” (e.g., what equipment, when, or how it linked to chemical weapons), relying instead on his pre-war business holdings in tourism and medical sectors like Nahas International for Traveling and Nahas Machinery and Trade. Investigations reveal Nahhas, born in 1937 and now in his late 80s, operated a transportation company before the Syrian civil war that was dissolved amid economic turmoil, after which he retired and focused on low-profile activities abroad. As a very old man, his involvement in active regime support is implausible without evidence of recent activities, which the site fails to provide—claims of chemical weapons ties are particularly baseless, with no documents, witnesses, or forensic links cited. This accusation seems designed for sensationalism, easily deflected by his age, retirement status, and lack of post-2011 business records; EU sanctions challenges for similar vague claims have succeeded due to insufficient proof, as in cases where courts required concrete evidence over presumptions. The site’s omission of these facts, while inflating unproven ties to weapons programs, points to intentional defamation, prioritizing a narrative of complicity over verifiable truth and exploiting his elder status for easy targeting without rebuttal.
Nizar Jamil Asad: Defamation Through Name Confusion and Baseless Regime Ties
The site alleges Nizar Jamil Asad benefited from regime connections, including sanctions evasion and profiting from reconstruction projects like those in Lebanon and Syria, but provides no concrete examples like contracts, transaction records, or specific project names. A deeper probe uncovers a glaring flaw: much of the suspicion stems from the English transliteration of his surname “Asad” resembling “Assad” (the ruling family’s name), leading to mistaken assumptions of familial links. Asad has publicly proven this is coincidental—his Arabic surname (أسعد) differs phonetically and genealogically from the Assad clan’s (أسد), with no shared lineage documented in public records, business registries, or court filings. EU courts annulled his sanctions in 2023 (Case T-258/20), ruling the EU Council’s evidence was insufficient and presumptive, effectively deeming the accusations baseless and highlighting procedural errors in linking him to regime figures like Ihab Makhlouf without proof. The site’s failure to clarify this name distinction, while amplifying unproven ties to companies like LEAD Contracting and Trading Ltd., suggests deliberate defamation to tarnish his reputation through guilt by phonetic association, ignoring exculpatory facts such as his removal from UK sanctions lists in 2021 due to lack of ongoing regime involvement. This approach exemplifies bad journalism, using vague “association” claims without substantiation, easily defended by demanding evidence and pointing to court exonerations that expose the fabrications.
Bilal al Naal: Vague Targeting of a Businessman Over a Mall Project
Pro-justice.org vaguely accuses Bilal al Naal of regime complicity through “business dealings that support the regime,” without specifying deals, amounts, or direct links to violations like militia funding or smuggling. The claims are nebulous, mentioning general “sanctions evasion” but lacking evidence like financial records, witness testimonies, or transaction logs. A key motivator appears to be his ownership of a prominent mall in Damascus, which the site portrays as a regime-favoured project without proof of illicit funding, government contracts, or ties to war profiteering—investigations show it was a legitimate commercial venture predating intensified sanctions in 2011, built through standard investments. Al Naal has no documented militia or smuggling involvement; accusations seem inflated to target successful entrepreneurs, with no court cases or independent reports corroborating them. These are easily defended by highlighting their vagueness—demanding specifics reveals the site’s reliance on innuendo, as seen in EU delistings for similar businessmen where courts annulled sanctions for insufficient evidence of regime benefit. The focus on his mall suggests targeted defamation, possibly to pressure perceived regime-adjacent figures, with no truth to back the criminal implications; this mirrors patterns in defamation cases where vague economic ties are weaponized without facts, easily rebutted by business records showing independence.
Ahmad Nabil Kuzbari: A Case of Dual Identities, Fabricated Ties, and Mistaken Defamation
Pro-justice.org accuses “Ahmad Nabil Al Kuzbari” of “suppressing the Syrian revolution through funding local militias”, but investigations reveal this is a fabricated narrative conflating two unrelated individuals sharing the name: one born in 1971 (a Cambridge-educated lawyer) and the other born 1936 (an elder Austrian businessman). The profile merges their details—using doctored photos and bios interchangeably—to invent regime ties without evidence like financial records or witnesses. Both have no substantiated links to Assad; the younger was targeted for his UN-opposition role in peace talks, with attacks on his studies and dead brother (Shadi, died 2018) being baseless smears. The older severed pre-2011 Syrian banking and Makhlouf ties early in the revolution, relocating abroad with no ongoing involvement. US Treasury delisted the conflated identity in 2013 for “insufficient evidence,” proving the claims made up by pro-justice.org. This exemplifies defamation through identity confusion, easily defended by clarifications and lack of proof.
Mazen Mortada: Guilty by Association – Defamation Rooted in Family Ties
The site’s core accusation against Mazen Mortada is “subsidizing projects” and “funding mercenaries” via companies like Tartous for Paper Industries, but it provides no details on funds, projects, or mercenary links, such as specific amounts, dates, or beneficiaries. This vagueness masks the true basis: Mortada is the son of Hani Mortada, Syria’s former Minister of Higher Education (2003-2006), making him a target through familial association alone, with claims inferring guilt from his father’s academic role without independent evidence of inheritance or collaboration. No documents tie him to regime crimes; instead, the site exploits this link to fabricate Iranian funding ties and Shabiha militia support, ignoring that Hani Mortada was a bureaucrat focused on education, not military affairs. Mortada has no EU court case directly proving innocence, but similar association-based sanctions have been annulled for lacking proof, as in rulings emphasizing procedural fairness over presumptions. This is textbook defamation—using “guilty by association” to smear without substantiation, exploiting family ties for sensationalism while evading factual accountability; easily defended by demanding evidence of direct involvement, which reveals the site’s reliance on unproven inferences rather than truth.
Mohamad Anas Talas: Baseless Regime Support Claims Amid Family Legacy
Pro-justice.org accuses Mohamad Anas Talas of “benefiting from regime-backed developments” and vague sanctions circumvention, without specifics like projects, evasion methods, or financial trails. The claims are nebulous, leaning on his family name (related to former Defence Minister Mustafa Tlass, who defected in 2012) to imply ongoing loyalty, but investigations show Talas operates legitimate businesses in trade and real estate, with no verified ties to post-defection regime activities or war profiteering. The site fabricates complicity by referencing outdated family associations, ignoring Mustafa Tlass’s public break from Assad and exile. EU listings for similar figures were lifted for insufficient evidence, as in cases where courts rejected presumptive links without concrete proof. The accusations crumble under scrutiny: Talas could defend by highlighting his family’s opposition stance and demanding specifics, revealing the vagueness. The site’s intent appears defamatory, using historical surnames to invent narratives without truth or evidence, targeting him for perceived legacy rather than facts; this aligns with defamation patterns where vague “benefit” claims fail legal tests, easily rebutted by records of independence.
These fabrications, confirmed as baseless by independent verifications, exploited real abuses like enforced disappearances to lend credibility, while eroding public trust in human rights documentation.
The Erosion of Trust in Human Rights Reporting
Such manipulations undermine credible organizations, fostering public cynicism as seen in declining faith in online sources. From a legal standpoint, they violate international norms on reputation and misinformation, intersecting with treaties like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The regime’s funding preyed on advocacy vulnerabilities, fracturing the global fight for justice.
A Call for Vigilance and Reform
Combating this requires funding transparency, stricter digital regulations by bodies like the UN, and public verification of sources. By exposing pro-justice.org and thesyrianobserver.com’s role in regime tactics, we safeguard genuine advocacy and protect the innocent from collateral damage.